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Initial Coin Offerings as Investment Contracts: 
Are Blockchain Utility Tokens Securities? 
Nate Crosser* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Current American jurisprudence on digital assets (e.g. Bitcoin) is 
woefully underdeveloped due to the rapid development and adoption of 
blockchain technology—creating an intellectual gold rush with agencies, 
attorneys, and techies all shouting their positions (on securities laws, 
particularly) into the wind.  This Comment enters the ether in an endeavor 
to counter prevailing federal agency narratives about the role of securities 
laws regarding “ICOs”—introducing the reader to the most pertinent 
features of blockchain technology and Initial Coin Offerings, introducing 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (the “SEC”) current 
regulatory approach, and applying the seminal Howey is-it-a-security test. 
Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) are the online sale of cryptographic 
assets used to launch a cryptocurrency, finance a blockchain application 
development project, or sell access to features of a blockchain 
application.1  ICOs, also called Token Sales or Token Generation Events, 
are  financing mechanisms popularly viewed as a hybrid of a Wall Street 
Initial Public Offering of Stock (IPO),2 venture capital,3 and crowdfunding 
(like Kickstarter).4  ICOs can be used to facilitate a broad range of 
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 1.   What is an ICO?, BITCOIN MAGAZINE (last visited Oct. 9, 2018) 
https://bitcoinmagazine.com/guides/what-ico/ [https://perma.cc/S37R-WKVH]. 
 2.   Kalyeena Makortoff, UK Launches ‘Deeper Examination’ of ICO Cryptocurrency Tokens 
After Consumer Warning, INDEPENDENT.IE (Dec. 15, 2017, 2:16 PM), https://www.independent.ie/ 
world-news/uk-launches-deeper-examination-of-ico-cryptocurrency-tokens-after-consumer-warning-
36411753.html [https://perma.cc/5SDU-YQ3J]. 
 3.   Annie Palmer, Venture Capitalists Warming Up to Cryptocurrency Initial Coin Offerings, 
THESTREET (Dec. 19, 2017, 4:48 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/14424493/1/venture-
capitalists-warm-up-to-initial-coin-offerings.html [https://perma.cc/2VUZ-XQB2]. 
 4.   James Titcomb, US Regulator Warns of ‘Fraud and Manipulation’ Amid Cryptocurrency 
Craze, TELEGRAPH, (Dec. 12, 2017, 5:43 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/ 
2017/12/12/us-regulator-warns-fraud-manipulation-amid-cryptocurrency-craze/ [https://perma.cc/ 
7XTE-GC9Y]. 
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offerings with varying features and varying legitimacy, but they generally 
use the same underlying blockchain technology and all follow a similar 
process: promoters write a white paper detailing a proposed or existing 
decentralized blockchain application (or “DAPP”)5 and solicit the 
exchange of existing cryptocurrencies (like Bitcoin or Ether) or fiat 
currencies (like US Dollars) for units of a the new internal digital currency 
(tokens or coins).6 
Blockchain applications have massive economy-disrupting potential.  
Some proponents compare them to the advent of the Internet itself and 
they are certainly one of the largest hotbeds of innovation and investment 
of the early 21st century.7  As of mid-December 2017, ICOs had raised 
nearly $4 billion8 globally to fund or launch DAPPs, with pre-product 
startups and tech giants alike capitalizing on the catalytic process.  Like 
other developments of the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution, like the 
“Internet of Things” (IOT), virtual reality, robotics, artificial intelligence, 
and synthetic biology, DAPPs and their enabling-ICOs provide the 
opportunity for unprecedented innovation9 and a commensurate 
redistribution of wealth—creating a gold-rush mentality10 as early 
adopters hope to cash in.  The ICO model has massive potential for 
promoting innovation and the democratization of entrepreneurial 
                                                          
 5.   Alyssa Hertig, What is a Decentralized Application?, COINDESK, 
https://www.coindesk.com/information/what-is-a-decentralized-application-dapp/ [https://perma.cc/ 
335M-66BF] (last visited Oct. 24, 2018).  
 6.   Chance Barnett, Inside the Meteoric Rise of ICOs, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2017, 1:21 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2017/09/23/inside-the-meteoric-rise-of-
icos/#10945aff5670 [https://perma.cc/8NQC-RMSV]. 
 7.   Randolph A. Robinson II, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion of Initial 
Coin Offerings, 9–11 (Dec. 14, 2017, last revised Aug. 16, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Tennessee Law Review). 
 8.   Steven Russolillo, Initial Coin Offerings Surge Past $4 Billion—And Regulators Are 
Worried, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2017, 4:54 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/initial-coin-offerings-
surge-past-4-billionand-regulators-are-worried-1513235196 [https://perma.cc/9T79-CNGG]. 
 9.   Nick Ismail, Blockchain: Funding the Fourth Industrial Revolution?, INFORMATION AGE 
(Nov. 6, 2017), http://www.information-age.com/blockchain-funding-fourth-industrial-revolution-
123469365/ [https://perma.cc/SUD2-2J3J]. 
 10.   Claire Brownell, Perils of the Crypto Currency Gold Rush, NAT’L POST (Canada), (Nov. 22, 
2017), https://www.pressreader.com/canada/national-post-latest-edition/20171122/28182716906 
9805 (“Investors are not doing their due diligence . . . . There’s greed in the market.” (citations 
omitted)).  Some issuers have made light of this market hysteria by releasing tokens such as “Jesus 
Coin,” “PonzICO,” and “Useless Ethereum Token” – and actually raised real money.  Id.  
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finance,11 but critics voice valid concerns of market bubbles,12 
cybersecurity threats,13 perverse incentives,14 hacking,15 money 
laundering,16 tax evasion,17 and fraud.18 
As ICOs have become socially and economically vogue, they present 
novel regulatory challenges19 to governments across the world scrambling 
to keep pace with the industry.20  The ICO market has been called the 
“Wild West” of finance because the regulatory and technological 
                                                          
 11.   See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 7, at 10, 16–17; Lindsay Lin, 3 Common Misconceptions 
About ICO Law, STELLAR (Aug. 31, 2017) [hereinafter 3 Common Misconceptions] 
https://www.stellar.org/blog/3-common-misconceptions-about-ICO-law/ [https://perma.cc/8LMS-
C2RL]; Laura Shin, Are ICOs For Utility Tokens Selling Securities? Prominent Crypto Players Say 
Yes, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2017, 9:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/10/02/are-icos-
for-utility-tokens-selling-securities-prominent-crypto-players-say-yes/#76c1e7d934fa 
[https://perma.cc/BW2D-PUU9]. 
 12.   Anthony Coggine, Mark Cuban Considers Bitcoin a Bubble, Bitcoin Price Tumbles Again, 
COINTELEGRAH (June 8, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/mark-cuban-considers-bitcoin-a-
bubble-bitcoin-price-tumbles-again [https://perma.cc/4PM9-G3AV]; Palmer, supra note 3.  
 13.   DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207, at 1 (July 25, 2017) [hereinafter SEC Release], 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7U2-MXS8] (hackers 
were able to exploit slock.it’s source code and steal close to one third of the ICO tokens, worth millions 
of dollars).  Discussion of the implications of hacks such as these is beyond the scope of this note.  
 14.   The paradigmatic ICO raises funds in the pre-product stage to develop a blockchain-enabled 
project, as opposed to more traditional private finance where funds are raised to scale an existing 
business after at least a prototype is created.  This front-loading of investment potentially creates a 
financial incentive for organizations to create a “white paper” (a kind of informal prospectus) and raise 
funds through the ICO, then “take the money and run” to their next opportunity rather than exert full 
effort of developing the product.  This incentive structure is why crowdfunding platforms like 
Kickstarter require prototypes and have protocols for returning funds to contributors.  To combat this 
incentive structure, it is common practice for ICOs to have a depository agent who holds the funds 
frozen until the terms in the white paper are fulfilled.  See Jin Enyi & Ngoc Dang Yen Le, Regulating 
Initial Coin Offerings (“Crypto-Crowdfunding”), 8 J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. (UK) 495 (Sept. 1, 
2017). 
 15.   See, e.g., Alex Hern, Bitcoin Buyer Beware: US SEC Warns ‘Extreme Caution’ Over 
Cryptocurrency Investments, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2017, 6:25 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
technology/2017/dec/12/bitcoin-buyer-beware-us-sec-warns-extreme-caution-over-cryptocurrency-
investments [https://perma.cc/A64H-MAA2]. 
 16.   Francine McKenna, Here’s How the U.S. and the World Regulate Bitcoin and Other 
Cryptocurrencies, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 28, 2017, 11:19 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/ 
story/heres-how-the-us-and-the-world-are-regulating-bitcoin-and-cryptocurrency-2017-12-18 
[https://perma.cc/5EXJ-JF8V]. 
 17.   Id. 
 18.   See Investor Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency-Related Investments, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N (May 7, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/investoralertsia_ 
bitcoin.html [https://perma.cc/BKS7-BHST]; Wolfie Zhao, $600 Fraud? Fake ICO White Papers Are 
Drawing Scrutiny, COINDESK (Updated Feb. 14, 2018, 7:07 UTC),  
https://www.coindesk.com/600-fraud-fake-ico-white-papers-draw-scrutiny-in-china/ 
[https://perma.cc/AQQ4-XDQ5]. 
 19.   See Robinson, supra note 7, at 24–26. 
 20.   McKenna, supra note 16. 
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uncertainty at this bustling frontier of finance, technology, and the law.21 
Among other agencies, the SEC, which regulates the sale of securities 
within its jurisdiction, has set its sights on ICOs because of similarities 
between ICOs and the sale of stocks and other investment vehicles, and to 
protect the American investing public against the financial mania ICOs 
have fueled.22  As of February 2018, many ICOs have been conducted, but 
none have been registered with the SEC despite the agency’s clear intent 
to assert authority in the space.23  Since the popularization of ICOs in the 
late 2010s, the SEC has shut down multiple ICOs as the sale of 
unregistered securities.24  The SEC has done so pursuant to its regulatory 
prerogative set forth in the Securities Act of 1933.25 
Although the SEC is clearly determined to regulate nearly all26 ICOs 
as the sale of securities, courts should exercise restraint and hold that ICOs 
of certain DAPP assets (i.e. true “utility tokens” as discussed later) can and 
sometimes should be viewed as the sale of digital consumer assets or 
commodities rather than investment contracts.  In applying the seminal 
“investment contract” Howey test, courts can resist categorical 
                                                          
 21.   See generally Robinson, supra note 7; Jorge Pesok & Samuel Brylski, SEC’s Blockchain 
Stance Will Likely Impact Exchanges, LAW360 (Aug. 8, 2017, 2:10 PM),  https://www.law360.com 
/articles/952055/sec-s-blockchain-stance-will-likely-impact-exchanges [https://perma.cc/ZC6Y-
F333]. 
 22.   Barbara Shecter, ‘It’s Going Crazy’: Canadian Watchdogs on High Alert over Initial Coin 
Offering ‘Mania’, FIN. POST (Dec. 18, 2017, 2:23 PM), https://business.financialpost.com/ 
technology/blockchain/its-going-crazy-canadian-regulators-on-alert-over-initial-coin-offering-mania 
[https://perma.cc/JJ4C-5JUP]. 
 23.   See, e.g., Joon Ian Wong, The US Senate Just Learned What Bitcoiners Mean by “Hodl”, 
QUARTZ (Feb. 6, 2018), https://qz.com/1200204/bitcoin-regulation-cftc-and-sec-weigh-in-on-crypto-
oversight-at-us-senate-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/VC8S-CNFB]; Victor Reklaitis, SEC Chairman: 
Bitcoin Offers ‘Substantially Less Investor Protection’ than Other Markets, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 
12, 2017, 7:35 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/sec-chairman-bitcoin-offers-substantially-
less-investor-protection-than-other-markets-2017-12-12 [https://perma.cc/CS45-WCHY]. 
 24.   Graham Rapier, The SEC Has Shut Down Another ICO–This Time an Alleged $600 Million 
Scam in Texas, BUS. INSIDER (January 30, 2018, 11:24 AM), https://markets.businessinsider.com 
/news/stocks/sec-shuts-down-arise-bank-600-million-alleged-ico-scam-dallas-texas-2018-1-
1014571716 [https://perma.cc/LH3G-NM3N]. 
 25.   Daniel N. Budofsky & Robert B. Robbins, The SEC’s Shutdown of the Munchee ICO, 
PILLSBURY (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/the-secs-shutdown-
of-the-munchee-ico.html [https://perma.cc/EES5-ADEZ]. 
 26.   See William Hinman, SEC Director, Division of Corporate Finance, Digital Asset 
Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic) (June 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech 
/speech-hinman-061418 [https://perma.cc/9SUC-2QNR] (acknowledging the possibility of creating  
cryptographic assets that are digital consumer goods, and not securities); see also Jay Clayton, 
Chairman, SEC, Testimony on “Oversight of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission” Before 
the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 115th Cong. (June 21, 2018) [hereinafter Clayton Testimony], 
https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-oversight-us-securities-and-exchange-commission 
[https://perma.cc/6RVS-S7PF] (“We have been clear—we are not relaxing our requirements that apply 
to the offer, sale and trading of securities.”).  
2018 INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS AS INVESTMENT CONTRACTS 383 
determinations about ICOs and should be cognizant of the far-reaching 
implications of their decisions.  Failing to do so would put form over 
substance, ignore the economic realities of some ICO transactions, and be 
judicially and socio-economically problematic.  As of June 2018, only one 
U.S. court has applied Howey to an ICO,27 but given the multiple SEC 
suits and class actions against promoters, the issue is before many courts.28 
 First, in Section II.A, this Comment describes the key features of 
blockchain technology, categorizes the types of crypto-assets, and 
provides background on ICOs and tokens, all of which are essential for a 
securities analysis of token sales.  Section II.B summarizes securities laws 
immediately relevant to this Comment and describes the seminal Howey 
test for identifying “investment contracts,” the catchall for residual types 
of securities.  Section II.C summarizes some of the SEC’s notable actions 
in the ICO space to situate the technology in the current regulatory 
landscape.  In Section III.A, this Comment applies Howey to utility tokens, 
explaining how and why courts should determine that authentic utility 
tokens are not necessarily securities.  Section III.B presents policy reasons 
against the broad applicability of securities regulations to ICOs.  Lastly, 
Section III.C argues that tokens should be regulated more like the sale of 
commodities, or assets like software licenses, gift cards, or (even) 
gambling chips. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The blockchain is the technological development that makes the 
creation of crypto-assets and Initial Coin Offerings, among many other 
applications, possible.29  The features that blockchain enables make it both 
a regulatory challenge and an economic tidal wave, and so, it is important 
for any lawyer in this space to have a basic grasp on these features.30 
                                                          
 27.   Rensel v. Centra Tech, Inc., No. 17-24500-CIV-KING/SIMONTON, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 106642, at *12–15 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2018) (calculating the likelihood of plaintiffs to succeed 
on the merits in a motion for temporary restraining order against ICO promoters, the judge held with 
limited analysis that the Centra token was a security).  The Eastern District of New York also analyzed 
an ICO in the commodity context.  See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. 
Supp. 3d 213, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 28.   See, e.g., Founder Starcoin, Inc. v. Launch Labs, Inc., No. 18-CV-972 JLS (MDD), 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113737 (S.D. Cal. July 9, 2018); Baker v. Dynamic Ledger Sols., Inc., No. 17-cv-
06850-RS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16879 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2018); GGCC, LLC v. Dynamic Ledger 
Sols., No. 17-cv-06779-RS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43728 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2018); In re Tezos Sec. 
Litig., No. 17-cv-06779-RS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88513 (N.D. Cal. May 25, 2018).  
 29.   See, e.g., Josiah Wilmoth, The Difference Between Utility Tokens and Equity Tokens, 
STRATEGIC COIN, https://strategiccoin.com/difference-utility-tokens-equity-tokens/ [https://perma.cc/ 
Y8D6-Y2DD] (last visited Oct. 24, 2018). 
 30.   See Robinson, supra note 7, at 9–11. 
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First, Section II.A.1 provides a basic explanation of fundamental 
blockchain features without delving into their technological 
underpinnings.  Section II.A.2 then distinguishes three categories of 
blockchain-enabled crypto-assets—cryptocurrencies (like Bitcoin), 
tokenized securities (or equity tokens), and utility tokens—and briefly 
describes their unique features.  Section II.B focuses on investment 
contracts: II.B.1 summarizes the SEC’s authority and purpose in 
regulating them and II.B.2 presents the Howey test for classifying 
offerings as investment contracts.  Finally, Section II.C describes recent, 
important SEC actions that illuminate its stance on ICOs. 
A. Blockchain, Crypto-Assets, and Initial Coin Offerings 
“Crypto-assets” is the inclusive term that encompasses all forms of 
cryptographic, digital assets arising from the use of distributed ledger 
(blockchain) technology.  Although drawing lines between types of 
crypto-assets is difficult, this Comment, along with many market 
participants,31 suggests putting them in three broad categories: 
cryptocurrencies (like Bitcoin), tokenized securities (or equity tokens), 
and utility tokens—the latter two of which will be discussed together in 
Section II.A.3.  Cryptocurrencies and the two types of tokens are 
technologically extremely similar but have different uses so it is helpful to 
distinguish them with different terminology. 
1. Blockchains (Distributed Ledger Technology) 
This Section serves to orient readers relatively unfamiliar with 
blockchain technology (also called “distributed ledger technology”) with 
some of the basic concepts that are essential to understanding what is being 
offered in an ICO and the regulatory challenge DAPPs pose. 
The blockchain concept was widely introduced in a 2009 white paper 
created by a mysteriously pseudonymous “Satoshi Nakamoto.”32  The title 
of the paper was “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System,” which 
became the basis for the most famous blockchain use-case, Bitcoin.33  For 
                                                          
 31.   See, e.g., Unibright.io, Coin vs. Token vs. Security—Regulated?, MEDIUM (Dec. 13, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@UnibrightIO/coin-vs-token-vs-security-regulated-9e3eb4af6b68 
[https://perma.cc/9PR7-LDKM]. 
 32.   Julia Finch, From Silk Road to ATMs: The History of Bitcoin, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 
2017, 2:21 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/13/from-silk-road-to-atms-the-
history-of-bitcoin [https://perma.cc/DQ5F-ANMZ]. 
 33.   See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (2009), 
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DU6-4PZH]. 
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several years, blockchain was relevant only to its most hardcore acolytes, 
but through cultural and economic phenomena such as the Silk Road (a 
dark web anarchy market),34 Bitcoin became a widely accepted currency 
(and speculation tool).35  ICOs and DAPP platforms like Ethereum brought 
the blockchain further into the public eye. 
a. Distributed Ledger: Disintermediated Authentication 
A blockchain is a network of computational systems (“nodes”) for 
encryption-protected data storage and disintermediated transactions—
eliminating intermediaries like PayPal, Facebook, or Amazon Web 
Services when transacting online.36  A blockchain is essentially an online 
peer-to-peer distributed ledger (accounting book), connecting all peer 
computers to every other peer, obviating the need for a central repository 
or authority to conduct, log, and authenticate online transactions.37  
Instead, when a transaction is recorded on one or more network computers, 
that transaction is reflected on the entire network as the system reconciles 
the slight addition to its code.38 
There are many blockchain systems around the world, but the two 
most culturally and financially significant are Bitcoin39 and Ethereum.40  
Each has a unique value proposition: Bitcoin is primarily an electronic 
currency and payment platform,41 while Ethereum is a blockchain which 
enables other DAPPs and sub-blockchains (or sub-protocols) to be built 
upon it, enabling most ICOs.42 
                                                          
 34.   Stephanie A. Lemchuk, Note, Virtual Whats?: Defining Virtual Currencies in the Face of 
Conflicting Regulatory Guidances, 15 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 319, 321 (2017). 
 35.   See, e.g., Rob Marvin, Blockchain: The Invisible Technology That’s Changing the World, 
PCMAG (Aug. 29, 2017, 1:38 PM), https://www.pcmag.com/article/351486/blockchain-the-invisible-
technology-thats-changing-the-wor [https://perma.cc/K7E7-S43C]. 
 36.   Id.  
 37.   See Enyi & Le, supra note 14, at 3.   
 38.   See, e.g., Marvin, supra note 35.  
 39.   Bitcoin is the original cryptocurrency and the blockchain that hosts the world’s most widely 
used cryptocurrency: Bitcoins (BTC).  Finch, supra note 32.   
 40.   Ethereum hosts the cryptocurrency called Ether, but what makes Ethereum important is that 
it is also a platform for creating and administering other self-executing programs, often called “smart 
contracts.”  Sebastián Peyrott, An Introduction to Ethereum and Smart Contracts: A Programmable 
Blockchain, AUTH0 (Mar. 28, 2017), https://auth0.com/blog/an-introduction-to-ethereum-and-smart-
contracts-part-2/ [https://perma.cc/4STB-L3YJ]. 
 41.   Lemchuk, supra note 34, at 320–24. 
 42.   Enyi & Le, supra note 14, at 14 n.121. 
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b. Smart Contracts: Pre-permissioned Transaction Automation 
A “smart contract” is a computer program that automatically executes 
the terms of an agreement, conducting transactions when certain 
conditions are met per the “if / then” commands of the code.43  Smart 
contracts are one of the most promising features of blockchain technology 
because they integrate well with the Internet of Things,44 reduce the risk 
of fraud,45 decrease arbitration and enforcement transaction costs,46 and 
automate unproductive labor.47 
c. Immutability and Security: Proof of Work and Mining 
Because transactions are recorded on a distributed ledger, no central 
authority exists to retroactively change past transactions, thus making 
transactions largely immutable.48  The computing power necessary to 
record these transactions is borne by computers on the network, where the 
computers cryptographically provide “proof of work” by solving 
mathematical equations in exchange for small bits of the blockchain’s 
native crypto-asset in a process called “mining.”49 
Only agreement between transacting parties or a consensus of network 
                                                          
 43.   NICK SZABO, SMART CONTRACTS (1994), http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/ 
InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart.contracts
.html [https://perma.cc/2JJZ-E56D]; SEC Release, supra note 13, at 2.  
 44.   See, e.g., Jonathan Chester, How Blockchain Startups Will Solve The Identity Crisis For The 
Internet Of Things, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanchester/2017/04/28/how-
blockchain-startups-will-solve-the-identity-crisis-for-the-internet-of-things/#6c75ad315c63 (April 
28, 2017). 
 45.   See, e.g., Daniel Newman, 3 Ways Blockchain Can Help Combat Fraud (April 17, 2018). 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielnewman/2018/04/17/3-ways-blockchain-can-help-combat-fraud/ 
#732c70f092a4. 
 46.   See SZABO, supra note 43. 
 47.   See Alyssa Hertig, What is a DAO?, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/information/ 
what-is-a-dao-ethereum/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2018).  
 48.   See, e.g., Ramesh Gopinath, Checking the Ledger: Permissioned vs. Permissionless 
Blockchains, IBM THINK BLOG (July 28, 2016), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/think/2016/07/ 
checking-the-ledger-permissioned-vs-permissionless-blockchains/ [https://perma.cc/6NH7-BSF9]. 
 49.   Commodities Futures Trading Commission, A CFTC Primer on Virtual Currencies, 
LABCTFC, 5–6 (Oct. 17, 2017), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/file/labcftc_ 
primercurrencies100417.pdf [https://perma.cc/RAM7-KALL].  
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computing power50 can reconcile errant transactions.51  No individual can 
typically control or own a public blockchain once it is activated unless the 
source code grants special permissions to the creator at the outset.52  This 
is a double-edged sword: hacking and internal fraud are difficult to carry 
out, but when a problem does arise, it can be difficult to solve. 
d. Autonomous Virtual Organizations 
Autonomous virtual organizations are those with sufficient pre-
determined protocols to operate primarily through smart contracts.53  
These protocols potentially obviate the need for management or central 
authority once the blockchain has gone live—a kind of democracy 
guaranteed by cryptography where changes to the code, and therefore 
governance, require an endogenous consensus of users rather than 
application of exogenous force.54 
e. Pseudonymity: Wallets and Private Keys 
Blockchain transactions do not typically contain directly identifying 
information about the parties to a transaction.55  Instead, parties use 
“public keys” to identify themselves when conducting transactions.56  A 
                                                          
 50.   Control on a blockchain is determined by a “consensus” of its users.  This consensus can be 
overridden if one user is able to control over half of all computing power used for the blockchain.  
Thus, the security of a blockchain increases as more peers join the network.  This is called a “51% 
Attack.”  SEC Release, supra note 13, at 6 n.21; Enyi & Le, supra note 14, at 4. When there is a hack, 
such as the fifty million dollars stolen in the DAO hack, blockchain network users will usually “vote” 
to move their crypto-assets to a new (but nearly identical) blockchain where the code does not 
recognize the hacker’s assets.  Hard Fork, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/h/hard-fork.asp [https://perma.cc/53FF-NLRQ] (last visited Oct. 12, 2018).  This is called a hard 
fork.  Id.  Individuals are free to remain on the original blockchain, but most will choose to conduct 
future transactions on the new blockchain because the old one has lost much of its value during the 
exodus.  Id.  
 51.   Because of the possibility of a 51% Attack, the more users of a blockchain, the more 
computing power it has, the more difficult it is for an entity to take control of the network.  Additional 
users on a blockchain add to its security.  See, e.g., Marvin, supra note 35. 
 52.   See generally Lucas Mearian, What Is Blockchain? The Most Disruptive Tech in Decades, 
COMPUTERWORLD (May 31, 2018, 1:35 PM), https://www.computerworld.com/article/3191077/ 
security/what-is-blockchain-the-most-disruptive-tech-in-decades.html?page=2 [https://perma.cc/ 
TCH4-5YH2].  
 53.   SEC Release, supra note 13, at 2. 
 54.   See, e.g., Nozomi Hayase, Cryptography as a Democratic Weapon Against Demagoguery, 
COINDESK (Updated Aug. 8, 2016 3:33 UTC), https://www.coindesk.com/cryptography-democratic-
weapon-demagoguery/ [https://perma.cc/SKK3-EZS2].  
 55.   DJURI BAARS, TOWARDS SELF-SOVEREIGN IDENTITY USING BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY, 
UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE 29, 46, 67, http://essay.utwente.nl/71274/1/Baars_MA_BMS.pdf. 
 56.   Carola F. Berger, Bitcoin Part 3—Hashes, Public Key Cryptography “For Dummies” and 
the Block Chain, CFB SCI. TRANSLATIONS & CONSULTING (June 29, 2015), 
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public key is like an address that identifies parties, but only to the extent 
they make personal information associated with that address available.57  
As an analogy, think of a public key as an address of a locked PO Box you 
can ship to and verify delivery.  The second component, the “private key,” 
would be the padlock combination (or password) the owner uses to open 
it.  This pseudonymity opens the door to “self-sovereign identity,” where 
some transacting parties hope to more tightly control personal information 
and maintain a transacting identity outside of government confines—
especially given the global distribution of network users and geospatial 
quirks of cyberspace.58  Pseudonymity is important because it can make 
tracking down and verifying the identities of individual participants, 
including blockchain royalty themselves like “Satoshi Nakamoto,” 
extremely difficult. 
2. Cryptocurrency 
Cryptocurrencies (e.g., Bitcoin) are peer-to-peer digital currency 
networks that get their namesake from the cryptographic, decentralized 
ledger technology that enables them.59  An individual “unit” of 
cryptocurrency is a “unit of account” and the blockchain is the “medium 
of exchange”60—two central aspects of traditional currencies.  
Cryptocurrencies are used like an electronically-stored account of fiat 
money (like a bank database that holds records of peoples’ money, rather 
than the physical money itself) but are actually just a decentralized ledger 
that tracks and records transactions (the “digital wallet”).61  
Cryptocurrencies are a libertarian’s dream: rather than being necessarily 
                                                          
http://www.cfbtranslations.com/bitcoin-part-3-hashes-public-key-cryptography-for-dummies-and-
the-block-chain/ [https://perma.cc/PY4G-FWLL]. 
 57.   Id. 
 58.   Antony Lewis, A Gentle Introduction to Self-Sovereign Identity, BITS ON BLOCKS (May 17, 
2017), https://bitsonblocks.net/2017/05/17/gentle-introduction-self-sovereign-identity/ [https://perma 
.cc/RD66-RNFL]; see also BAARS, supra note 55, at 13.   
 59.   See Ken Griffith, A Quick History of Cryptocurrencies BBTC—Before Bitcoin, BITCOIN 
MAG. (Apr. 16, 2014, 5:10 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/quick-history-cryptocurrencies-
bbtc-bitcoin-1397682630/ [https://perma.cc/KE9F-2A5T].  
 60.   See, e.g., Daniel Krawisz, Bitcoin as a Store of Value, Unit of Account, and Medium of 
Exchange, SATOSHI NAKAMOTO INST. (Jan. 12, 2015), http://nakamotoinstitute.org/mempool/bitcoin-
as-a-store-of-value-unit-of-account-and-medium-of-exchange/ [https://perma.cc/S7SJ-WABN].  
 61.   David Yermack, Bitcoin Lacks the Properties of Real Currency, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 18, 
2015), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/524666/bitcoin-lacks-the-properties-of-a-real-
currency/; Mark D. Young, Maureen A. Donley & Theodore M. Kneller, Bitcoins and the Blockchain: 
The CFTC Takes Notice of Virtual Currencies, SKADDEN, (Jan. 2016), https://www.skadden.com/ 
insights/publications/2016/01/bitcoins-and-the-blockchain-the-cftc-takes-notice [https://perma.cc/ 
H7UK-7J9Z] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). 
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backed by any government’s fiat currency or commodity stores (e.g., the 
gold standard) they reduce the role of central banking and have value 
simply because people mutually assent to their use in transactions.62  Their 
value is bolstered by network effects and protected by a critical mass of 
users.63  Given their volatility and lack of sovereign or physical-asset 
backing, there is disagreement whether cryptocurrencies are a “store of 
value”—a benchmark of traditional currencies.64 
Cryptocurrency is distinguished from tokens by, unsurprisingly, being 
designed to act as an external currency (e.g., Bitcoin can be used to buy 
goods like cars)65 whereas a token acts as an internal asset native to a 
DAPP66 (e.g., Ether, Ethereum’s “crypto-fuel” can be used to transact 
within the platform).67 
                                                          
 62.   Robert J. Anello & Christina Lee, New-Wave Legal Challenges for Bitcoin and Other 
Cryptocurrencies, LAW.COM (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/11/07/new-
wave-legal-challenges-for-bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrencies/?slreturn=20180802223437 
[https://perma.cc/852G-L4P6]. 
 63.   See Primoz Kordez, The Economics of Blockchain Protocols, MEDIUM (Aug. 24, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@primoz.kordez/the-economics-of-blockchain-protocols-18bca548e596 
[https://perma.cc/G8H8-8ZK9]; Marvin, supra note 35; Nicole Vincent Fleming, Staying Current: 
Bitcoin and Other Cryptocurrencies, FED. TRADE COMM’N CONSUMER INFO. (Sept. 23, 2014), 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2014/09/staying-current-bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrencies 
[https://perma.cc/9HKK-MHBW].  Although usually not backed by any physical assets, some 
cryptocurrency promoters have fraudulently purported to do so, and others have legitimate plans to be 
backed by and tied to the price of commodities like oil reserves or precious metals.  See, e.g., OilCoin, 
World’s First Legally Compliant Cryptocurrency Backed by Oil, PETROBTC (Jan. 2, 2018), 
https://petrobtc.com/2018/01/oilcoin-worlds-first-legally-compliant-cryptocurrency-backed-by-oil/ 
[https://perma.cc/3BMF-BL6W]; Goldcliff Clarifies Gold Based Cryptocurrency Plan, GOLDCLIFF 
RES. CORP. (Dec. 11, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2017/12/11/ 
1250796/0/en/Goldcliff-Clarifies-Gold-Based-Cryptocurrency-Plan.html [https://perma.cc/A9HB-
WGPX]. 
 64.   See, e.g., Yermack, supra note 61.  
 65.   See, e.g., Melanie Hicken, Someone Bought a $100,000 Tesla with Bitcoins, CNN MONEY 
(Dec. 12, 2013, 11:49 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/12/06/autos/tesla-bitcoin/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/96PG-SPKJ]. 
 66.   See, e.g., John Koetsier, Tim Draper On Bitcoin: ‘In 5 Years If You Use Fiat Currency, They 
Will Laugh At You’, FORBES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
johnkoetsier/2017/11/07/tim-draper-on-bitcoin-in-5-years-if-you-use-fiat-currency-they-will-laugh-
at-you/2/#4c24baa96cfb [https://perma.cc/JGP5-Z5NU]; Nick Grossman, Cryptonetworks and Why 
Tokens Are Fundamental (March 13, 2018), https://www.nickgrossman.is/2018/cryptonetworks-and-
why-tokens-are-fundamental/ [https://perma.cc/KU3E-APLS].  
 67.   Ether is not intended to be valid tender in the outside world, unlike Bitcoin, but is rather 
intended to be used by entities within the Ethereum network to purchase computing power to run 
applications built on top of the Ethereum network.  See Ether: The Crypto-Fuel for the Ethereum 
Network, ETHEREUM, https://www.ethereum.org/ether (last visited Oct. 12, 2018); Rensel v. Centra 
Tech, Inc., No. 17-24500-CIV-KING/SIMONTON, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100720, at *42 n.1 (S.D. 
Fla. June 14, 2018) (“Ether, on the other hand, is a necessary input, often called the ‘native asset,’ used 
to pay the Ethereum platform, a decentralized world computer upon which users can build and run 
applications, to perform certain tasks. . . . Ether is generally characterized as a cryptocommodity, 
rather than a cryptocurrency, but it can and does function like a cryptocurrency in many respects.”). 
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Many federal agencies are exerting concurrent jurisdiction over 
cryptocurrencies.68  The Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
steadfastly asserts that cryptocurrencies are commodities.69  The Internal 
Revenue Service has determined they are taxable property.70  The SEC 
points out that cryptocurrency is considered money for the purposes of its 
regulations.71 
Cryptocurrencies were the first crypto-assets to catch on, and have 
done so in a big way: as of mid-December 2017, Bitcoins were collectively 
worth more than all the securities of Visa or Coca-Cola.72  Chicago traders 
started selling Bitcoin futures in December 2017, treating it like foreign 
currencies or traditional commodities,73 but this speculation is a byproduct 
rather than a feature of cryptocurrencies.74 
3. Initial Coin Offerings (also known as Token Sales) 
ICOs are the online sale of blockchain tokens.  Tokens are given in 
exchange for relatively liquid cryptocurrency (like Bitcoin) or fiat 
currency in an ICO to fund the development of a distributed ledger project 
or jump-start an ecosystem of users in a DAPP.75  Tokens come with 
                                                          
 68.   Chris Burniske & Adam White, Bitcoin: Ringing the Bell for a New Asset Class, ARK 
INVEST, https://ark-invest.com/research/bitcoin-new-asset-class [https://perma.cc/JNK7-4DKU] 
(scroll down and click “download white paper”) (last updated Jan. 2017).  
 69.   In the Matter of Coinflip, Inc., CFTC Docket No. 15-29, at 3 (Sept. 17, 2015), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpl
eading/enfcoinfliprorder09172015.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2BP-ANR6].  
 70.   INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS VIRTUAL CURRENCY GUIDANCE: VIRTUAL CURRENCY IS 
TREATED AS PROPERTY FOR U.S. FEDERAL TAX PURPOSES; GENERAL RULES FOR PROPERTY 
TRANSACTIONS APPLY (March 25, 2014), https:www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Virtual-Currency-
Guidance [https://perma.cc/9AQ9-C6AR].  
 71.   SEC Release, supra note 13, at 11 (citing SEC v. Shavers, 2014 WL 4652121, at *1 (E.D. 
Tex. Sept. 18, 2014) (holding that bitcoin was money for the purposes of Howey)); see also Uselton 
v. Comm. Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 574 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 72.   Kim Jaewon, South Korea Joins in Asia-Wide Bitcoin Crackdown, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. 
(Dec. 14, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/South-Korea-joins-in-Asia-wide-
bitcoin-crackdown [https://perma.cc/7E8K-YP7X].  
 73.   Makortoff, supra note 2. 
 74.   Marissa Lee, Bitcoin and the Art of Market Manipulation: An Inquiry into Value, THE BUS. 
TIMES SING. (Dec. 18, 2017, 5:50 AM) [hereinafter Bus. Times Sing.] https://www.businesstimes.com. 
sg/banking-finance/bitcoin-and-the-art-of-market-manipulation-an-inquiry-into-value [https://perma. 
cc/8W3Q-ZF3W] (“[T]he level of professional attention springing up around bitcoin says nothing 
about the digital token’s intrinsic value.  Bitcoin is a great proof of concept for blockchain technology, 
and has so far been a great trading opportunity.  As a substitute for fiat currency or a store of value 
however, it makes a weak case.  Very simply, exchanges are pressing ahead with bitcoin futures 
because it is a lucrative business.”). 
 75.   See generally CoinBase, A Securities Law Framework for Blockchain Tokens (last updated 
Dec. 7, 2016) [hereinafter CoinBase] https://www.coinbase.com/legal/securities-law-framework.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y9TZ-DKGR] (explaining the best practices in token sales and relevant legal 
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various rights and features and may or may not purport to confer any actual 
ownership interest or voting power in an organization.76  Tokens are 
essentially the internal cryptocurrency of the blockchain on which they are 
issued and may have resale value on secondary markets.77  The value of 
these tokens largely derives from the perceived functional utility of the 
token and expectations of its future value, commensurate to the DAPP’s 
stage of development.78  Tokens are also called protocol tokens, app coins, 
or coins, among other names. 
There are two broad categories of tokens: equity tokens and utility 
tokens.79  Not everyone agrees that drawing such a distinction between the 
two types is practical nor do all agree on specific terminology.80  The lines 
between the two are blurred, and token promoters often purport to sell a 
“utility token” when their offer functions as little more than a fundraising 
vehicle.81  Because labels are not dispositive, thoughtfully drawing 
distinctions is key to determining whether a token sale is the sale of a 
security. 
a. Tokenized Securities 
Tokenized securities, also termed security tokens or equity tokens,82 
are stand-ins for shares of corporate stock or startup equity,83 with their 
value tied to the value of the issuing organization (or the blockchain 
application the token is native to).  A tokenized security, like stock of a 
                                                          
analysis surrounding Blockchain tokens).  
 76.   Id. at 9–10; See also Nicolas Morgan, David M. Hernand & Vivian Tsai, A Light Regulatory 
Touch on Initial Coin Offerings, LAW360 (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/950189/a-
light-regulatory-touch-on-initial-coin-offerings [https://perma.cc/VA5H-HPK2]. 
 77.   See Morgan, Hernand & Tsai, supra note 76. 
 78.   Pesok & Brylski, supra note 21.  Unfortunately, opportunists have leveraged the crypto-
mania surrounding ICOs to manipulate the public by “guaranteeing” returns and utilizing celebrity 
endorsements like Paris Hilton, among others.  Palmer, supra note 3.  This, along with security 
concerns, has made government involvement essential.  China, for example, has gone as far as banning 
ICOs altogether.  Bus. Times Sing., supra note 74. 
 79.   Wilmoth, supra note 29; see also Shin, supra note 11; Robert Smith, The Rise of the Utility 
Token, NEWSBTC (Sept. 12, 2017, 2:30 PM), http://www.newsbtc.com/2017/09/12/rise-utility-token/ 
[https://perma.cc/LG4Q-TQWE]; Micha Benoliel, Understanding the Difference between Coins, 
Utility Tokens, and Tokenized Securities, MEDIUM (Aug. 8, 2017), https://medium.com/startup-
grind/understanding-the-difference-between-coins-utility-tokens-and-tokenized-securities-
a6522655fb91 [https://perma.cc/QU3D-X6YR]. 
 80.   Shin, supra note 11. 
 81.   See, e.g., Benoliel, supra note 79; see also Hinman, supra note 26.  
 82.   See Wilmoth, supra note 29.  “Security token” is technically a broader term than “equity 
token,” with the former encompassing the latter.  Id.  A security token is securitized by an asset as 
collateral like real estate, gold, or equity in an entity.  Id. 
 83.   See, e.g., Benoliel, supra note 79; Brownell, supra note 10. 
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public corporation, can typically be resold on secondary markets for a 
profit if the value increases,84  unlike with traditional venture capital where 
interests are not easily alienable.  Usually, equity tokens have little-to-no 
utility beyond conferring a right to future profits of the issuing 
organization or, more commonly, the promise of appreciation of the token 
itself.85  The circumstances of such “promises” and the structure of the 
DAPP are the major determinants of whether a crypto-asset is a tokenized 
security.86  Tokenized securities can come with additional rights, like the 
ability to vote on uses for the pooled funds or actual (or constructive) 
ownership in an entity,87 but ultimately these rights exist to support the 
primary purpose of raising funds to be used or controlled by a third party 
or the issuer.88 
The sale of equity tokens is a trendy and relatively easy way to raise 
capital.  Unfortunately, many sales of these crypto-assets run counter (or 
at least orthogonal) to the spirit of an autonomous organization designed 
to run on a blockchain—instead using the ICO mechanism to skirt 
securities laws or otherwise nefariously abuse ICO-mania.89  There is 
general agreement that the sale of tokenized securities in an ICO 
constitutes the sale of securities.90 
b. Utility Tokens 
The second kind of tokens are utility tokens (also termed user tokens 
or DAPP tokens).91  Utility tokens can be tradeable on secondary markets 
                                                          
 84.   See Wilmoth, supra note 29.  Additionally, equity tokens can represent debt owed by the 
company to the token holder, creating a market for micro-loans to businesses.  Id.  These securities 
would likely be considered “notes” rather than “investment contracts” and is beyond the scope of this 
Comment.  
 85.   Shin, supra note 11. 
 86.   See Hinman, supra note 26.  
 87.   Wilmoth, supra note 29. 
 88.   Voting rights can actually make an offering look more like a security rather than less.  See 
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985) (“[W]e concluded that we must also 
determine whether those instruments possess ‘some of the significant characteristics typically 
associated with’ stock recognizing that when an instrument is both called ‘stock’ and bears stock’s 
usual characteristics, ‘a purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal securities laws apply’.  We 
identified those characteristics usually associated with common stock as (i) the right to receive 
dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged 
or hypothecated; (iv) the conferring of voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned; and 
(v) the capacity to appreciate in value.” (citations omitted)).  
 89.   See generally Marco Santori, Appcoin Law: ICOs the Right Way, COINDESK (Oct. 15, 2016, 
4:04 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/appcoin-law-part-1-icos-the-right-way/ [https://perma.cc/ 
CS5B-QHRS]. 
 90.   See, e.g., Hinman, supra note 26. 
 91.   See Cryptographic Tokens, BlockchainHub (last accessed Oct. 12, 2018), 
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and appreciate like tokenized securities, but primarily exist to integrate 
into the blockchain application they are issued for.  Utility tokens, like 
Ethereum’s Ether,92 are often used as a currency internal to the DAPP and 
are the grease in the wheels of an incentive structure created to promote 
beneficial behavior on the DAPP.93  The token’s existence is essential to 
the functioning of the system,94 like a decentralized cloud-storage 
application95 that allows people to trade excess storage capacity on their 
computer systems for tokens.96  In that example, although the utility token 
may appreciate as the usefulness of the application is proved, its primary 
function is as an internal currency that incentivizes people to buy and sell 
excess storage capacity on their computers in exchange for tokens.  Simply 
put, utility tokens have “consumptive use value or a commercial 
purpose,”97 and are not fundamentally intended to be relied on as a passive 
investment vehicle.98  Utility tokens can be used on the application to 
engage in transactions and earn rewards, while increasing the value of the 
network (and therefore the token at resale) due to network effects.99  Utility 
tokens have been compared to gambling chips,100 tradable gift cards,101 
(pre-sold) software licenses,102 franchise agreements,103 sporting event 
tickets,104 and more. 
The concept of utility tokens aligns with the essence of blockchain 
technology: pseudonymous actors interacting in a distributed ecosystem 
                                                          
https://blockchainhub.net/tokens/ [https://perma.cc/23LV-SCZ5]. 
 92.   See, e.g., Hinman, supra note 26 (“And putting aside the fundraising that accompanied the 
creation of Ether, based on my understanding of the present state of Ether, the Ethereum network and 
its decentralized structure, current offers and sales of Ether are not securities transactions.”).  
 93.   See generally STEEM, https://steem.io [https://perma.cc/3589-PRR6] (last visited Oct. 12, 
2018) (demonstrating the blockchain social networking application, Steem, grants tokens to those who 
create and promote quality content.). 
 94.   Kordez, supra note 63. 
 95.   Protocol Labs, Filecoin: A Decentralized Storage Network, FILECOIN, at 1 (July 19, 2017) 
[hereinafter Filecoin], https://filecoin.io/filecoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ2P-J7T8]. 
 96.   Id. 
 97.   Shin, supra note 11. Compare utility tokens to Pokémon cards.  The intended use of 
Pokémon cards is to engage in Pokémon battles with friends, even though some collectors purchase 
and hold onto them with the hopes their value will appreciate over time.   
 98.   CoinBase, supra note 75, at 22. 
 99.   Kordez, supra note 63. 
 100.   Enyi & Li, supra note 14. 
 101.   Lindsay Lin, Why ICOs Should Want to Be Securities, COINDESK (October 2, 2017) 
[hereinafter Why ICOs Should Want to Be Securities] https://www.coindesk.com/icos-want-securities/ 
[https://perma.cc/QPM2-4SD2]. 
 102.   Id. 
 103.   CoinBase, supra note 75, at 20–22. 
 104.   See Wilmoth, supra note 29 (comparing utility token price fluctuations to that of sporting 
event tickets). 
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designed to promote mutually beneficial behavior with the token acting as 
an internal currency.  SEC Chairman Jay Clayton stated that he has yet to 
see any ICOs that are not the sale of securities, including those that purport 
to be utility token sales.105  However, the SEC has acknowledged the 
possible existence of non-security utility tokens, focusing on the digital 
consumer’s motivations and structure of the DAPP in categorizing 
them.106 
As argued in Part III, utility tokens should not be considered securities 
but rather as items for consumptive and commercial use because of their 
usability as native digital assets integral to the underlying application, the 
reasonable motivation of purchasers, the importance of network effects, 
and the negative policy implications of applying securities regulations to 
utility tokens. 
B. Investment Contracts 
The Securities Act of 1933 Section 2(1) defines a “security” as any 
“note, stock, treasury stock . . . , bond, debenture, evidence of 
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing 
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or 
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust 
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, . . . [and more].”107  This 
Section will first provide background on the Securities Act, then describe 
the Howey test that courts use to classify investment contracts, and finally 
summarize how the SEC has applied this test in its first few actions. 
1. The SEC 
The purpose of the SEC, an independent federal administrative 
agency, “is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient 
markets, and facilitate capital formation.”108  The SEC, under 
                                                          
 105.   E.g., David N. Feldman, SEC Chair Clayton Comments on Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), 
DUANE MORRIS BLOGS (Nov. 10, 2017), https://blogs.duanemorris.com/capitalmarkets/ 
2017/11/10/sec-chair-clayton-comments-on-initial-coin-offerings-icos/ [https://perma.cc/7CZ2-
A447]; David Michaels & Paul Vigna, SEC Chief Fires Warning Shot Against Coin Offerings, WALL 
STREET J. (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-chief-fires-warning-shot-against-coin-
offerings-1510247148.  
 106.   See Hinman, supra note 26 (“[T]here are contractual or technical ways to structure digital 
assets so they function more like a consumer item and less like a security.”).  Near the end of his 
speech, Director Hinman provides a non-exhaustive list of considerations.  Id.  
 107.   15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 108.   What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html 
[https://perma.cc/SJB8-434D] (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) [hereinafter What We Do].  
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Congressional authorization, investigates and prosecutes securities 
violations in interstate (online) commerce, particularly to protect “Main 
Street” and institutional investors.109 
The vast majority of relevant SEC authority derives from the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, of which 
the legislative purpose is to “eliminate serious abuses in a largely 
unregulated securities market . . . to prevent fraud and to protect the 
interest of investors.”110  In exercising power over the initial issuance of 
tokens, the SEC derives its authority from the Securities Act of 1933,111 
which defines a security as any disposition of an “investment contract,” 
among other things.112 
The Securities Act of 1933 was enacted to restore investor confidence 
following the stock market crash of 1929 and has been updated as recently 
as the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act in 2012.113  The acts 
impose disclosure-focused statutory prospectus and registration 
requirements on any person offering securities in the United States to 
promote a more informed investing public.114 
Unless there is an applicable exemption to registration, it is illegal to 
sell unregistered securities in the United States.115  The risks of 
noncompliance with securities registration requirements are severe, 
including fines, rescission of sales, cease-and-desist orders, bans from 
market participation, or five years imprisonment under Section 5 of the 
Securities Act (plus private causes of action under Sections 12(a)(1) and 
17(a)(1) of the Act.)116  Additionally, the SEC Office of Investor Education 
                                                          
 109.   See Clayton Testimony, supra note 26 (“I am very optimistic that developments in financial 
technology, including distributed ledger technology, will help facilitate capital formation, providing 
promising investment opportunities for institutional and Main Street investors alike.”). 
 110.   United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975). 
 111.   15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012). 
 112.   Id. § 77b(a)(1). 
 113.   1 K&L GATES, SECURITIES PRACTICE GUIDE §§ 1.01, 2.01 (2018). 
 114.   Id. § 1.01.  
 115.   See generally Santori, supra note 89; SEC Release, supra note 13, at 10 (“Section 5(a) of 
the Securities Act provides that, unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it is unlawful 
for any person, directly or indirectly, to engage in the offer or sale of securities in interstate 
commerce.”).  There is no scienter requirement.  SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 
1047 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding that negligent selling of unregistered securities alone is sufficient, thus 
no scienter requirement). 
 116.   Why ICOs Should Want to Be Securities, supra note 101.  Even if a token avoids federal 
securities regulations, it may still be subject to state-specific “blue sky” laws.  Id.  See also Fast 
Answers: Blue Sky Laws, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (last modified Oct. 14, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-blueskyhtm.html [https://perma.cc/JK5F-QL63]; Peter M. 
Saparoff, John F. Nucci & Joel D. Rothman, Private Placement Securities Litigation, AM. BAR. ASS’N. 
(September 9, 2015),  https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/securities/articles/ 
2015/summer2015-0815-private-placement-securities-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/C8H3-TFZ7].  
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protects the public by producing and sharing educational materials for 
investors,117 including a July 25, 2017 Investor Bulletin that gives advice 
to anyone considering participating in an ICO.118  In September 2017, the 
SEC announced the creation of a Cyber Unit, FinTech Working Group, 
and Distributed Ledger Technology Working Group within its 
Enforcement Division to approach novel regulatory challenges like 
ICOs.119 
In addition to bringing actions against issuers for the unregistered sale 
of securities, the SEC commonly brings actions for fraud against 
disingenuous promoters.  These consumer protections have been 
important in the ICO space, as bad actors try to cash in on the crypto-
mania.  For example, the SEC Cyber Unit brought fraud charges against a 
serial securities-laws violator who raised $15 million through an ICO120 
and two promoters of ICOs falsely claiming to be backed by real estate 
and diamonds.121 
Promoters may avoid compliance with most securities requirements, 
other than anti-fraud provisions, if the instrument qualifies and the 
promoter applies for an exemption to registration.  Many issuers may 
choose to issue tokens under Regulation D (the private-placement-to-
accredited-investors),122  Regulation S (the offshore-offers-and-sales-safe-
                                                          
 117.   What We Do, supra note 108. 
 118.   Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_coinofferings [https://perma.cc/BT53-
NA8M].  
 119.   SEC Announces Enforcement Initiatives to Combat Cyber-Based Threats and Protect Retail 
Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2017-176 [https://perma.cc/L8GD-8RFG]; See Clayton Testimony, supra note 26. 
 120.   Stan Higgins, SEC Files Fraud Charges Against ICO Organizer, COINDESK (Dec. 4, 2017, 
2:35 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/sec-files-fraud-charges-canadian-ico-organizer/ [https://perma. 
cc/U3JP-352U]. 
 121.   SEC Exposes Two Initial Coin Offerings Purportedly Backed by Real Estate and Diamonds, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-185-0 
[https://perma.cc/L73S-ZNV8]; Complaint, SEC v. ReCoin, 17 Civ. 5725 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2017/comp-pr2017-185.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KBU-
23PD]; see also Litigation Release No. 24081, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 26, 2018) 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2017/comp-pr2017-185.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z64T-
KN4Q].  
 122.   Shelley Goldberg, Expanding the Definition of “Accredited Investor”, WALL STREET DAILY 
(Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.wallstreetdaily.com/2016/02/25/accredited-investor-private-equity/ 
[https://perma.cc/E9FS-GBKU]; Investor Bulletin: Private Placements Under Regulation D,  U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/news-
alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletin-private-placements-under [https://perma.cc/VKJ2-EMJS]; 
Gregory J. Nowak & Joseph C. Guagliardo, Blockchain and Initial Coin Offerings: SEC Provides 
First U.S. Securities Law Guidance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 9, 
2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/08/09/blockchain-and-initial-coin-offerings-sec-provi 
des-first-u-s-securities-law-guidance/ [https://perma.cc/XB5K-CT2C]. 
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harbor),123 Regulation A (small-and-additional-issues-of-securities),124 
and Regulation Crowdfunding125 exemptions rather than face compliance 
with initial public offering requirements, although each has important 
limitations and legal requirements.126 
The role of the federal court is to “decide which of the myriad financial 
transactions in our society come within the coverage of these statutes.”127  
Here, that is whether an instrument fits within the definition of “security.”  
Courts generally give weight to the SEC’s interpretations of a statute it is 
responsible for administering, but its ultimate deference is to the clear 
meaning of the statute.  Deference increases when an agency follows a 
formal rule-making process.128 
In all enforcement actions against unregistered ICOs to date, the SEC 
has sought to categorize tokens as securities by attesting they are 
investment contracts under Howey.  As of October 2018, no appellate 
federal court has ruled on whether and when an ICO of a legitimate utility 
token constitutes an investment contract (or security generally).  Although 
largely beyond the scope of this Comment, it is important to recognize that 
the Howey test, although the likely battleground for much ICO securities 
litigation, is not the sole test used for determining whether an offering is a 
                                                          
 123.   U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Final Rule: Offshore Offers and Sales (Regulation S), Release 
Nos. 33-7505, 34-39668, https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7505.htm [https://perma.cc/ZVC9-
DD69]; Jor Law, Don’t Panic! US Securities Exemptions for Initial Coin Offerings, CROWDFUND 
INSIDER (Aug. 21, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2017/08/120850-dont-panic-
us-securities-exemptions-initial-coin-offerings/ [https://perma.cc/L4PH-D9DL]. 
 124.   U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions 
under the Securities Act (Regulation A), Release Nos. 33-9471; 34-74578; 39-2501, 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9741.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YCN-8BZ4]. 
 125.   U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide 
for Issuers (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-051316.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3YWW-3WLH].  Title III of the JOBS Act added section 4(a)(6) to the Securities 
Act allows for the exemption from registration for some crowdfunding transactions.  Id.  According 
to the SEC, “[c]rowdfunding is a relatively new and evolving method of using the Internet to raise 
capital . . .  through . . . small individual contributions from a large number of people . . . [where] 
[i]ndividuals . . .  may share information about the project, cause, idea or business . . . to decide 
whether to fund the campaign based on the collective ‘wisdom of the crowd.’” Id. at n.2. 
 126.   Why ICOs Should Want to Be Securities, supra note 101.  For further reading on securities 
exemption in the ICO context see, jrlmaker, Securities Exemptions for ICOs 
https://steemit.com/crypto-news/@jrlmaker/securities-exemptions-for-icos [https://perma.cc/WV22-
DBDC] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).  
 127.   Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990) (citations omitted). 
 128.   See CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); CFTC v. Sterling 
Trading Grp., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1265–66 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (citing TVA v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 
1236, 1250 (11th Cir. 2003)) (“Chevron deference is confined to those instances in which the agency 
renders its interpretation in the course of a rulemaking proceeding or adjudication . . . . [E]ven if an 
agency’s interpretation of its own statute is advanced in the course of litigation rather than through a 
rulemaking or agency adjudication, courts will still pay some deference to the agency’s 
interpretation.”). 
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security. States may apply their own investment contract tests, like the 
Risk Capital Test, for the purposes of their own state securities laws.129  
Further, ICOs could potentially fall into another subcategory of security, 
like a note, and thus be subject to alternative tests such as the Family 
Resemblance Test.130  The following Section presents the Howey test as it 
currently stands. 
2. The Howey Test 
In determining whether an offering constitutes an “investment 
contract,” federal courts look to the common law and apply a test set forth 
in the 1946 Supreme Court case of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. and its 
progeny.131 
The Howey Court defined an investment contract as a “scheme 
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to 
expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party”132 
and the definition “embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one 
that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes 
devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise 
of profits.”133  Securities are meant to include any instrument that falls 
within society’s commercial conception of a security so that passive 
investors are protected.134  The Court has broadly construed investment 
contracts to include “novel, uncommon, or irregular devices”135 in 
                                                          
 129.   Courts in several states, including California and Michigan, use the four-pronged test, the 
Risk Capital Test to identify securities.  3 Common Misconceptions, supra note 11.  First, the issuer 
must raise money for an enterprise.  Id.  Second, the issuer must indiscriminately offer the fundraising 
opportunity to the public at large.  Id.  Third, the investor must be only in a passive position to affect 
the enterprise’s success.  Id.  Fourth, the investor’s contribution must be inadequately secured and 
substantially at risk.  Id.  Essentially, if a widely offered investment opportunity is sufficiently risky, 
it will trigger securities laws protections.  Id.  See generally Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 
Cal. 2d 811 (1961) (pre-purchased club memberships were risk capital because the country club had 
not been built and therefore investors were at a high risk of loss).  This test is often applied in the 
context of start-up capitalization before a product or service has been built. See CoinBase, supra note 
75, at 16.  See also Jet Set Travels Club v. Corp. Comm’r, 21 Or. App. 362 (1975).  This test may 
apply regardless of whether an ICO issuer escapes SEC enforcement.  Why ICOs Should Want to Be 
Securities, supra note 101.  
 130.   See generally, Reves, 494 U.S. 56; 3 Common Misconceptions, supra note 11. 
 131.   See generally, SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004). 
 132.   SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946). 
 133.   Edwards, 540 U.S. at 393 (citations omitted). 
 134.   United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847–48 (1975) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1933)).  
 135.   See SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943) (“[T]he reach of the 
[Securities] Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace.”).  
2018 INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS AS INVESTMENT CONTRACTS 399 
“whatever form they are made and by whatever name they are called.”136  
The court focuses on the economic realities underlying the transaction and 
puts substance over form—regardless of the use of technology in the 
offerings.137  The Howey test will be broken into constituent parts below.  
“An offering is an investment contract if there is: (1) an investment of 
money (2) in a common enterprise (3) with the expectation of profits to 
come solely from the efforts of others.”138 
a. The Investment of Money 
The first prong of the Howey test, investment of money, is construed 
broadly and exists to protect investors from financial loss—including cash, 
goods, notes, or other assets.  Courts have concluded that cryptocurrencies 
can constitute investments of money.139  Because tokens are typically 
given in exchange for cryptocurrency or fiat money, any such ICO can 
rightly be considered an investment of money.140 
b. In a Common Enterprise 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not made a specific ruling on the 
“common enterprise” prong of Howey, but lower courts have taken 
different approaches to how the common enterprise prong is met.141 
First is the “horizontal approach” where courts examine whether 
individual investors’ fortunes are tied to those of the other investors in a 
scheme.142  Generally, if there is a pooling of funds, courts will find there 
                                                          
 136.   See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990) (“Congress’ purpose in enacting the 
securities laws was to regulate investments, in whatever form they are made and by whatever name 
they are called.” (emphasis omitted)).  
 137.   See C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. at 352–53. 
 138.   Rensel v. Centra Tech, Inc., No. 17-24500-CIV-KING/SIMONTON, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 106642, at *13 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2018) (quoting Tippens v. Round Island Plantation LLC, 
No. 09-CV-14036-MOORE/LYNCH, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66224, at *9 (S.D. Fla. July 31, 2009)). 
 139.   SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13–CV–416, 2014 WL 4652121, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014) 
(holding that bitcoin was money for the purposes of Howey); see Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace 
Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 574 (10th Cir. 1991) (extending the investment prong to include an 
“exchange of value” including the provision of goods and services).  Crypto-assets are sometimes 
given in exchange for borrowed computing power (via a process called “mining”).  Santori, supra note 
89; CoinBase, supra note 75, at 24.  This is beyond the scope of this Comment because the types of 
ICOs contemplated are capital formation devices that exchange tokens for money. 
 140.   SEC Release, supra note 13, at 11.  A more difficult question arises in the “mining” context, 
where participants contribute computing power (and significant electricity) in exchange for crypto-
assets. 
 141.   K&L GATES, supra note 113, § 2.03. 
 142.   CoinBase, supra note 75, at 13; Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 
F.2d 216, 221–22 (6th Cir. 1980).  
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is a common enterprise under this approach.143  Arrangements do not fit 
the horizontal enterprise requirement if they are structured more like 
general partnerships than limited partnerships.144 
Alternatively, under the “vertical approach” (sometimes split into 
“narrow vertical” and “broad vertical”),145 courts look instead to the link 
between the fortunes of the investor and the promoter.146  Where returns 
are interwoven and dependent on the actions147 or expertise148 of the 
promoter, a common enterprise will be found.  Theoretically, if a promoter 
creates a truly decentralized autonomous organization where the value of 
the instrument relies primarily on the beneficial actions of the other 
holders rather than the promoters and their agents, there is no vertical 
common enterprise.149  Additionally, a DAPP developed and launched 
before conducting an ICO may indicate a lack of dependence of token 
buyers on the continued efforts of the promoter.150 
c. With the Reasonable Expectation of Profits 
The “reasonable expectation of profits” prong of Howey refers to the 
expectation of the buyer as to what she will receive for her investment.151  
To meet this prong, the transaction must be premised on the expectations 
of profits.152  Generally, “profits” refer to the increase in value (fixed or 
variable) of an investment through dividends, periodic payments, 
appreciation of the instrument, or similar means.153  The expectation of 
profit must be the primary, but need not be the sole motivation for the 
investment.154  If purchasers are motivated by a desire to consume the 
purchased item, then securities laws do not apply.155  Additionally, a 
contributor’s expectation of appreciation of their investment may not be 
the primary reason for her contribution; she may have personal or 
                                                          
 143.   K&L GATES, supra note 113, § 2.03. 
 144.   For a thorough discussion on this point, see Robinson, supra note 7, at 44–45. 
 145.   CoinBase, supra note 75, at 13. 
 146.   SEC v. Eurobond Exch. Ltd., 13 F.3d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 147.   Id.  This is the narrow vertical approach.  CoinBase, supra note 75, at 13. 
 148.   SEC v. Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974).  This is the broad 
vertical approach.  CoinBase, supra note 75, at 13. 
 149.   See Robinson, supra note 7, at 38–40; CoinBase, supra note 75, at 13–14. 
 150.   See generally Hinman, supra note 26. 
 151.   SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 395–96 (2004); K&L GATES, supra note 113, § 2.03. 
 152.   See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 561 (1979) (emphasis added) (citing 
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)). 
 153.   Edwards, 540 U.S. at 394; CoinBase, supra note 75, at 16–17. 
 154.   Santori, supra note 89. 
 155.   Forman, 421 U.S. at 852–53. 
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commercial purposes.156  For example, the Court has held that cooperative 
apartment buy-ins were not securities, even where resale value was 
expected to increase, because a purchaser’s primary motivation in 
contributing was to acquire a place to live.157 
As discussed in Section III.A.2, utility tokens may function more like 
an apartment co-op if the purpose of the holder is to use the token for 
personal or commercial reasons and appreciation is an expected 
byproduct—like a person buying a Beanie Baby (or Cryptokitty).158 
Courts typically view this prong through the lens of the Howey test’s 
fourth prong: whether the expectation of profits arises from the promoters 
or from third parties engaging in the acts that create the returns for the 
holder.159  Marketing materials, including third-party comments ratified by 
the promoter, have been extremely important in priming the expectations 
of buyers.  For example, the SEC has indicated that advertising or 
promising a secondary market for the resale of tokens lead to an 
expectation that buyers are purchasing a security, as described in Section 
II.C.2.  If the expectations of the contributor are similar to those of a 
contributor making a passive investment, then this prong will probably be 
satisfied.160 
d. Derived from the Efforts of Others 
The original wording of Howey’s final prong required that the 
expectation of profits arise “solely” from the efforts of others, but the 
language has since been broadened.161  The standard is now whether “the 
efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant 
ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success 
                                                          
 156.   See Daniel, 439 U.S. at 553 (“And with respect to the expectation-of-profits element, while 
the pension fund depends to some extent on earnings from its assets, the possibility of participating in 
asset earnings is too insubstantial to bring the entire transaction within the Securities Acts.”). 
 157.   Forman, 421 U.S. at 858 (“There is no doubt that purchasers in this housing cooperative 
sought to obtain a decent home at an attractive price.  But that type of economic interest characterizes 
every form of commercial dealing.  What distinguishes a security transaction—and what is absent 
here—is an investment where one parts with his money in the hope of receiving profits from the efforts 
of others, and not where he purchases a commodity for personal consumption or living quarters for 
personal use.”). 
 158.   Tim Marcin, What Are Cryptokitties? Latest Craze Involves Virtual Cats Selling For 
$100,000 on Ethereum Blockchain, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 7, 2017, 3:15 PM), https://www.newsweek.com 
/what-are-cryptokitties-virtual-cats-sold-millions-dollars-ethereum-blockchain-741525 
[https://perma.cc/262N-ANYU]. 
 159.   CoinBase, supra note 75, at 17.  
 160.   Id.  
 161.   SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc. 474 F.2d 476, 481–83 (9th Cir. 1973). 
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of the enterprise.”162  In other words, courts examine whether the success 
of a common enterprise necessarily arises from the significant managerial, 
entrepreneurial, or other efforts of the promoter or third party.163  It is 
unclear whether reliance on the actions of other token-holders would 
satisfy this prong.  That determination would depend on the rights and 
interests that a token confers and the features of the relevant DAPP.164  The 
allocation of meaningful, essential voting rights to contributors of an 
enterprise, for example, has led courts to hold that this prong is not met.165  
Courts have considered the sophistication of investors166 and the ability to 
utilize their position to protect themselves167 as important factors in 
determining whether they are reliant on the promoter or third party.  The 
amount of control over a DAPP’s protocols withheld by a promoter will 
invariably affect this prong.168 
e. With a Focus on the Economic Reality of the Transaction 
Courts look to the commercial context and the terms of an offer in 
light of all the circumstances to determine whether Congress intended the 
Securities Act to cover the offering.169  Because U.S. securities laws are 
disclosure-based and not substance-based, it is insignificant whether there 
is a high risk of loss to an investment, so long as the market has adequate 
information.170  As the Howey Court put it, “[I]t is immaterial whether the 
                                                          
 162.   Bamert v. Pulte Home Corp., 445 Fed. App’x 256, 262 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Williamson 
v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 163.   Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 561 (1979); Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 
F.2d at 482–83; SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974); CoinBase, 
supra note 75, at 17.  Some courts, however, have maintained the original language of Howey, 
requiring a literal application of the word “solely”.  See Hirsch v. Dupont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1218–
20 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff’d, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 164.   See CoinBase, supra note 75, at 9–11. 
 165.   Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 421 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Klaers v. St. Peter, 942 
F.2d 535, 536, 538 (8th Cir. 1991) (non-managing general partners retained eighty percent of voting 
rights, which was enough to allow them to exert control through the voting process). 
 166.   Stewart v. Ragland, 934 F.2d 1033, 1038–40 (9th Cir. 1991) (non-operators of a well 
contracting agreement were sophisticated investors able to protect themselves). 
 167.   Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1983) (stressing the importance of leverage and 
ability of investors to protect themselves). 
 168.   See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 562 (1979). 
 169.   Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687 (1985). 
 170.   SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (“We reject the suggestion of the 
Circuit . . . that an investment contract is necessarily missing where the enterprise is not speculative 
or promotional in character and where the tangible interest which is sold has intrinsic value 
independent of the success of the enterprise as a whole.”); see also SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 
320 U.S. 344, 352 (1943) (“It is urged that because the definition [of security] mentions ‘fractional 
undivided interest in oil, gas or other mineral rights,’ it excludes sales of leasehold subdivisions by 
parcels.  Oil and gas rights posed a difficult problem to the legislative draftsman. Such rights were 
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enterprise is speculative or non-speculative or whether there is a sale of 
property with or without intrinsic value.”171 
f. And Disregarding Form for Substance 
Although potentially relevant, the terminology a promoter affixes to 
an offering is not dispositive as to its status as a security.172  Rather than 
the method, structure, or name in which an offering is made, courts focus 
on the characteristics of the offer itself and the circumstances of the 
offering.173  This focus on substance is essential to evaluating the offering 
against the spirit and intent of the Acts.174  In doing so, courts look at a 
purchaser’s reasonable belief in what they are buying and whether the 
belief is based on the offered instrument itself and the actions of the 
promoter.175  If a person, trained or untrained, buying an instrument would 
expect it to be covered by securities laws (based on name and 
characteristics in context), then its purchase is likely to fall within the 
scope of the Act.176 
Finally, just because an offering is attached to a larger scheme that 
involves securities or because similar-appearing offerings are securities, 
does not mean the instrument should itself be considered a security.  As 
Justice Frankfurter said in his Howey dissent: “Simply because other 
arrangements may have the appearances of this transaction but are 
employed as an evasion of the Securities Act does not mean that the 
present contracts were evasive.  I find nothing in the Securities Act to 
indicate that Congress meant to bring every innocent transaction within 
                                                          
notorious subjects of speculation and fraud, but leases and assignments were also indispensable 
instruments of legitimate oil exploration and production.  To include leases and assignments by name 
might easily burden the oil industry by controls that were designed only for the traffic in securities.”). 
 171.   Id. 
 172.   United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 850–51 (1975) (“In holding that the 
name given to an instrument is not dispositive, we do not suggest that the name is wholly irrelevant to 
the decision whether it is a security.  There may be occasions when the use of a traditional name such 
as ‘stocks’ or ‘bonds’ will lead a purchaser justifiably to assume that the federal securities laws apply.  
This would clearly be the case when the underlying transaction embodies some of the significant 
characteristics typically associated with the named instrument.”); Landreth, 471 U.S. at 690. 
 173.   Howey, 328 U.S. at 301; Forman, 421 U.S. at 852. 
 174.   Forman, 421 U.S. at 849 (citing Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 
459 (1892)). 
 175.   Id. at 851 (“Common sense suggests that people who intend to acquire only a residential 
apartment in a state-subsidized cooperative, for their personal use, are not likely to believe that in 
reality they are purchasing investment securities simply because the transaction is evidenced by 
something called a share of stock.”). 
 176.   Landreth, 471 U.S. at 693 (discussing how stock is the paradigmatic security that tempers 
the expectations of purchasers and is therefore clearly covered by the Acts). 
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the scope of the Act simply because a perversion of them is covered by the 
Act.”177 
C. SEC Enforcement Actions 
This Section will provide some background on SEC action in the ICO 
space, highlighting the major developments of 2017 and early 2018 that 
represent the SECs first steps in regulating the industry. 
1. Release No. 81207 and the “DAO” 
On July 25, 2017, the SEC published its first major release regarding 
ICOs (the “Release”).178  SEC releases made pursuant to Section 21(a) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, such as the Release, are not formal 
adjudications of fact, but rather reports following an investigation of 
suspected misconduct.179  They are intended to provide information and 
guidance to the public and the courts180 and set out a regulatory 
roadmap.181  SEC investigative releases are not binding, but courts do give 
them deference,182 without relying on the SEC’s findings or arguments.183  
Given that ICOs and related technologies are cutting-edge and courts 
typically lag in their understanding of new technologies,184 courts may be 
inclined to give special deference to the SEC.  Amidst a flurry of SEC 
                                                          
 177.   Howey, 328 U.S. at 302 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  
 178.   SEC Release, supra note 13. 
 179.   Id. at 2 n.2. 
 180.   Id.  
 181.   Margaret A. Dale & Mark D. Harris, The SEC Concludes that Digital Tokens May Be 
Securities, N.Y.L.J. (Aug. 8, 2017, 2:04 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/ 
1202795025475/The-SEC-Concludes-That-Digital-Tokens-May-Be-Securities/?mcode=1380566174 
563&curindex=14 [https://perma.cc/PM5K-JKQU]. 
 182.   See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 (2008) (“[W]e defer to an agency’s 
reasonable interpretations of the statute when it issues regulations in the first instance. . . .”); Trinity 
Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 337 n.9 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Each of the SEC’s 
interpretive releases was adopted after notice and comment and thus merits our deference.”); Dep’t of 
Labor v. E. Associated Coal Corp., 54 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 1995) (“We accord greater deference to 
an administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulations than to its interpretation of a statute.” 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added)); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (discussing precedential value of SEC letters).  
 183.   Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 563, 566 (1979) (“Our own review of the 
record leads us to believe that this reliance on the SEC’s interpretation of these legislative and 
administrative actions was not justified . . . [T]here are limits, grounded in the language, purpose, and 
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activity in the field,185 the purpose of the SEC’s July 2017 Release was to 
put the blockchain community on notice that it intended to regulate the 
emerging industry.186  If the SEC plans to exert a lasting regulatory 
prerogative over ICOs, then it will need a court or the legislature to 
confirm the Commission’s jurisdiction over the offerings it seeks 
enforcement against. 
In the Release, the SEC condemned German company Slock.it after 
the company launched a popular ICO to fund an entity called the “DAO” 
(“Decentralized Autonomous Organization”) but failed to comply with the 
Securities Act registration requirements.187  Although the SEC does not 
use the terminology, it essentially determined that the DAO ICO was the 
sale of tokenized securities, equating the sale to a public venture capital 
company fundraiser.188  The DAO ICO raised approximately $150 million 
to be pooled and re-invested into other projects approved by a vote of 
token holders through the DAPP’s protocols (subject to significant 
managerial control vested in a group of Slock.it-affiliated managers called 
“curators”).189  According to the SEC, the DAO tokens were tokenized 
securities rather than utility tokens because these insider curators had 
plenary authority over the deal pipeline.190  Additionally, the DAO 
investment voting system was structured in a way that discouraged 
authentic involvement by token holders, and promoters persistently 
advertised the tokens as an investment opportunity.191 
Industry uncertainty following the release was palpable.  Experts 
described the Release as anywhere from a “light regulatory touch,”192 to a 
“warning shot,”193 to a “crackdown”194 because of its ambiguity and 
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factual focus.  If nothing else, the Release foreshadowed the SEC’s intent 
to pursue regulatory action in the future without providing much concrete 
guidance.195 
This uncertainty, the prospect of regulation, and the specter of class 
action litigation196 have had a chilling effect in the crypto-industry,197 
leading to the exclusion of many members of the American public from 
being able to invest in some major ICOs.198 
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2. Munchee’s Cease-and-Desist Order & Settlement 
In December 2017, the SEC sent a Cease-and-Desist Order to 
Munchee, Inc., a California restaurant-review-app-company, after the $15 
million ICO of a purported utility token.199  Considering the tokens sold 
by Munchee (called MUN) had real utility, this came as a shock to many 
in the ICO community who believed such tokens were beyond the purview 
of the SEC.200 
MUN tokens were both given to users for writing restaurant reviews 
(which they could use to redeem discounts at partner restaurants) and sold 
to restaurants that would use the tokens to pay for advertising on the 
platform.201  This sounds like a quintessential utility token, but in the 
context of the MUN “ecosystem” it was not so—at least in the view of the 
SEC.  Munchee hoped more users would be attracted to use the DAPP 
because of the helpful reviews and the value of the MUN tokens would 
appreciate due to their increasing demand and limited supply (in fact, a 
diminishing number due to a “burn” policy).202  After this value increase, 
MUN holders could sell their MUN on secondary exchanges for a profit.  
Munchee went as far as to guarantee a resale market and lauded MUN’s 
projected appreciation in their promotional materials.203 
According to the SEC Order, MUN token sales were unregistered 
investment contracts because MUN purchasers expected their profits to 
arise from continued DAPP development, cultivation of Munchee’s 
ecosystem (incentive structure),204 and Munchee’s promoters playing a 
major role in the application for at least several years per their product 
roadmap.205 
The Order stands for the proposition that calling a token a “utility 
token” and having a use-case native to the DAPP does not absolve it from 
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registration in the SEC’s eyes,206 and that the SEC intends to make strong 
moves in the utility token space.207  The Order also stands for the 
proposition that the SEC is perhaps more concerned with the marketing 
surrounding ICOs, rather than the substance of the ICO itself.  For 
example, the SEC emphasized the fact that the Munchee application would 
only be available in the United States, yet MUN tokens were marketed and 
sold across the world, plus the fact that Munchee released promotional 
material aimed at crypto-speculators essentially guaranteeing returns.208  
Despite Munchee clearly disclaiming in its ICO white paper that MUN 
tokens were not a passive investment, their actions clearly betrayed their 
words.209 
3. SEC Chair Statement and Regulatory Mindset 
On December 11, 2017 SEC Chairman Jay Clayton released a public 
statement on cryptocurrencies and ICOs, mainly concerned with providing 
considerations for “Main Street Investors.”210  Most interestingly, before 
stating that “the structures of [all] initial coin offerings that I have seen 
promoted involve the offer and sale of securities,” Clayton gave an 
example of an ICO that might not be a security.211  Clayton stated that in 
addition to marketing materials, the SEC is concerned with the 
developmental stage of projects: 
For example, a token that represents a participation interest in a book-of-
the-month club may not implicate our securities laws, and may well be 
an efficient way for the club’s operators to fund the future acquisition 
of books and facilitate the distribution of those books to token holders.  
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In contrast, many token offerings appear to have gone beyond this 
construct and are more analogous to interests in a yet-to-be-built 
publishing house with the authors, books and distribution networks all to 
come.212  
Clayton ends his statement with a reassurance that the SEC will continue 
to “vigorously” assert itself in the ICO space.213 
Although neither binding law nor adjudication of fact, Chairman 
Clayton’s statement distills his, and therefore the SECs, stance on ICOs.  
The agency sees the technology’s promise overshadowed by manic 
speculation and deception in the market.214 
III. ANALYSIS 
This Part will argue that DAPP utility tokens should not be considered 
securities.  First, it will describe the difficulties of applying Howey to 
utility tokens and why analysis of utility tokens should yield a result 
favorable to an honest, non-manipulative ICO promoter.  Then, this Part 
will provide policy reasons why courts should not categorize most utility 
tokens as securities.  Finally, this Part briefly describes alternative means 
to regulate ICO-mania other than through securities registration. 
A. Applying Howey to Utility Tokens 
In its DAO and Munchee releases the SEC analyzed Howey.215  In both 
instances, the SEC determined the examined tokens were securities 
without explicitly describing them as either equity tokens or utility tokens, 
although Munchee explicitly claimed its MUN was a utility token.216  
However, in the absence of misleading marketing efforts, such as 
“guaranteeing” returns, utility tokens sales should not be considered 
investment contracts, as this Part endeavors to support. 
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1. Factual Intensity & Jurisdictional Issues 
The litigation-intensive process of Howey application may be 
impractical in a rapidly-developing, global, and online front.  The amount 
of controversy and disagreement as to the applicability of Howey to ICOs 
may indicate that Howey is an antiquated and inadequate framework for 
handling these issues.217 
a. Application of Howey is Necessarily a Factually Intense Question 
Because courts will likely examine each Howey claim anew under 
each unique set of facts, it is inherently a time-and-resource-consuming 
task for the court, regulators, and issuers alike to adjudicate in each 
instance.218  The court is required to look beyond the form of the token and 
its sale to divine its essence.219  Although ICOs may be structurally similar, 
each token may provide radically diverse rights and functionality to their 
holders, arising under different contexts, and therefore the court must 
endeavor to understand these unique features.  These features include, but 
certainly are not limited to: access and use rights, license rights, labor 
contribution compensation, non-money computing power contributions, 
re-sale rights, franchise rights, many varieties of voting rights, ownership 
interests in the entity, equity interest in the application, profit sharing, loss 
liability, sharing of assets, claims in bankruptcy, debt obligations, control 
of source code, vesting requirements, and convertibility.220  An adjudicator 
must understand how these rights and interests apply to holders of 
particular tokens, how they interplay and counterbalance, whether they are 
meaningful or trivial, durable or fleeting, promised or delivered, and 
ultimately must draw fine (and squiggly) lines between tokens that 
primarily represent equity with those that represent utility.  Adjudicators 
must also attempt to understand who was transacting, why they transacted, 
what their expectations were, at what point in the application development 
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stage was the token issued, what was the ongoing involvement of the 
issuer, what representations did they make and what are their implications, 
how sophisticated was the investor, and more. 
Given that technology, particularly in the blockchain space, develops 
much quicker than does jurisprudence, the courts may find themselves 
assigned a novel, nuanced “21st century problem with 18th century 
tools.”221  Courts and startups alike are ill-equipped, underfunded, and 
generally too busy for these kinds of fact-intensive disputes.  Although 
Howey’s definition of investment contract embodies a “flexible rather than 
a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless 
and variable schemes devised . . .”,222 it is much easier said than applied. 
Given the sheer number of permutations of rights and interests 
associated with tokens, particularly tokens with utility, regulatory 
certainty will be hard to come by—unless courts make sweeping 
judgments regarding these technologies, which may be more disruptive 
than helpful.223  Lingering regulatory uncertainty “attending the 
applicability of the Acts would hardly be in the best interests of either party 
to a transaction.”224  This uncertainty will be inevitable unless the 
pendulum swings back past the SEC and courts or legislatures create 
carve-outs for some ICOs from the securities laws. 
b. There will Almost Always be Jurisdictional Issues 
Certain features of blockchain applications present difficult 
jurisdictional questions that must be tackled in most adjudications.225  The 
pseudonymity of which many blockchain participants and crypto-asset 
users transact with makes tracking them down and verifying their identity 
problematic.226  The globally distributed, liquid networks and start-up 
teams that constitute and create blockchains may make it impractical to 
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locate a principal place of business or establish exactly where transactions 
are taking place.227  When smart contracts allow applications and 
organizations to run autonomously, it becomes difficult to determine who 
is responsible for causing what to happen—is it the coders who launch the 
applications, or those who trigger occurrences down the road?  These 
issues, and more, will present themselves in any enforcement action. 
2. Howey and Expectations 
ICOs almost certainly involve the investment of money, and analysis 
of such is beyond the scope of this Comment.  Whether token holders are 
in a common enterprise with each other or with the ICO promoters is a 
cloudier question, but also beyond this Comment’s focus.  This Section 
instead focuses on the expectations of token buyers, the third discussed 
prong of the Howey test. 
a. Reasonable utility token holders do not have the same expectations as 
passive investors 
If a utility token holder expects that her actions can improve number 
or value of her tokens, then she is incentivized to engage with or promote 
the application on which she is a stakeholder. Although, like in many 
aspects of the economy, the specter of free riding exists, her best strategy 
for maximizing token value involves using it (or at least relies on the 
implicit assumption that the token will have use to her or others in the 
future).  Understanding this, a reasonable participant, one who at least 
marginally understands the technology and model before investing, will 
be motivated by the usefulness of the tokens for commercial or personal 
use.  When the typical purchaser is attracted solely by the promise of 
potential financial returns, the instrument looks like a security; but when 
the purchaser intends to use, consume, or occupy the instrument, then 
securities laws should not apply.228  In examining stocks that allowed the 
purchaser to live in a democratically owned and controlled housing 
cooperative, the Court in United Housing Foundation v. Forman held that 
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despite potential economic interest in appreciation at resale, the purchase 
of stock was to secure a commodity for personal use and therefore not a 
security.229 
The information in and framing of the offer in promotional materials 
will surely affect expectations of purchasers.230  In Forman, the investment 
materials sought to attract stock purchasers by heralding the benefits of the 
housing cooperative to residents rather than profits from the investment, 
which favored the determination that the stock was not a security.231  
Slock.it’s DAO, on the contrary, advertised itself as an investment vehicle, 
and therefore purchasers expected relatively passive income—at most they 
would have to vote on pooled investment proposals.232  Additionally, when 
Munchee heavily marketed and sold MUN overseas (where there were no 
partner restaurants), it should have been prima facie evidence that those 
purchasers could not have been buying with consumptive intent.   If a 
blockchain application token has true utility, however, then that utility will 
(or should) certainly be emphasized by the promoters in marketing 
materials and white paper.  It also seems clear that if a white paper has a 
clear legal disclaimer pointing out that the consumer should not expect 
SEC intervention, then we should construct their expectations to reflect 
that. 
Finally, the SEC seems to assume that investors in ICOs are 
representative of the U.S. investor population at large.  However, tokens 
are not available on consumer platforms like E*TRADE—consumers 
must have a special level of sophistication to access ICOs and a higher risk 
tolerance to buy into DAPPs that rely on network effects and typically 
have no physical assets as collateral.  In determining whether a housing 
cooperative’s stock was a security in Forman, Justice Powell pointed to 
the common-sense beliefs of the stock purchasers and whether the 
characteristics of that stock “in our commercial world fall within the 
ordinary concept of a security.”233  Courts should situate their analysis in 
the commercial context in which the transactions occur: here, the market 
for blockchain application tokens.  The ICO market is a market where 
relatively sophisticated, risk-tolerant parties expect to get utility from 
utility tokens and do not expect government oversight of the process—
especially when white papers explicitly warn of the lack of securities 
protections, like Munchee’s did.234 
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b. The Value of Utility Tokens Relies on the Activities of Users 
The SEC’s Munchee cease-and-desist order does not support the idea 
that where a DAPP relies on the network of users itself to create value, 
then the efforts of the token holders themselves are undeniably essential—
though it should.  The SEC argues that the Munchee ecosystem’s designed 
requirement that its users transact in MUN tokens was not essential enough 
to circumvent Howey.  However, where an ICO’s marketing and structure 
is less focused on pure token-value appreciation and more on the existence 
of a robust DAPP ecosystem, it shows that the undeniably essential efforts 
are those of the participants. This is especially true when a post-
development DAPP is operated by smart contracts (as opposed to 
promoters). 
An analysis of a genuine utility token235 shows that token holders, 
buying into what is essentially an incentive structure, reasonably expect 
primarily to benefit, financially, commercially, or personally, from their 
own actions and the collective actions of other token holders, not the 
promoters.  With Filecoin, for example, token holders expect to be able to 
use their tokens to purchase storage from another participant’s excess 
digital storage capacity.236  Alternatively, when the participant provides 
her excess storage, she expects to receive tokens in return.  Both parties, 
and the network itself, are enriched by mutual participation. Supplemental 
cyber security audits and promotional activities by the issuers are more 
like incidental services (of which they are rewarded by retaining or earning 
their own tokens) rather than the activities that create value for token 
holders.237  The fact that issuers make the market and add some value 
should not make an instrument a security if the majority of the value of the 
enterprise (or at least a necessary amount) comes from the active 
participation of the instrument holders.238  
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Further, appreciation of the token on secondary markets as the 
application’s usefulness is proved should not be attributed solely to the 
promoters, but to the mutually beneficial behaviors of the token holders 
and the network effects they bring.  Bitcoin, for a prolific example, only 
has value as a currency because its users transact with it, and its value as 
a currency increases as more people decide to recognize its validity.  
3. Focusing on Economic Realities and Placing Substance over Form 
As the SEC points out in its release, “form should be disregarded for 
substance,”239 “and the emphasis should be . . . on the economic realities 
underlying a transaction . . . .”240  This means that making categorical 
determinations as to the applicability of securities laws on the basis of the 
token sale’s occurrence is improper, absent policy contravention or carve-
out to the contrary.  Thus far, the SEC has seemed more focused on the 
(oftentimes opportunistic) marketing efforts and external hype 
surrounding an ICO itself, rather than the substance offered in the DAPP.  
Impropriety in the industry does not diminish the right of each ICO to be 
individually judged.  To lump ICOs together and constructively presume 
they are securities would be to focus on the form of the offering rather than 
the substance—to focus on the vehicle itself as opposed to the instrument 
it contains.  To refuse the existence of legitimate, non-security utility 
tokens would be to throw the baby out with the bathwater, or as Justice 
Frankfurter put it, “bring every innocent transaction within the scope of 
the Act simply because a perversion of them is covered by the Act.”241  As 
discussed throughout this analysis, the economic reality of utility tokens 
does not lend itself to classification as an investment contract nor do the 
commercial participants expect it. As the technology progresses and 
developers create better DAPPs that run on better smart contracts with less 
human intervention, our economic reality shifts as DAPPs get further away 
from our general conceptions of business organizations.  Ultimately, if the 
code and the crowd primarily run a DAPP ecosystem, then the undeniable 
economic reality is that securities laws do not make sense to apply. 
Finally, in Howey, which analyzed the sale of securitized citrus 
groves, there was no right of instrument holders to a specific fruit in the 
grove nor did they have a general right of entry on the groves—the produce 
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was farmed, pooled, and sold by the company, then profits were 
distributed.242  With tokens, the holder has a right to the specific token they 
purchased, which is protected by cryptography and accessible only with 
the holder’s private key, which gives them the exclusive right to access 
and use the token; far from an abstract indicia of a right to profit. 
Although tokens are intangible and sometimes heralded as 
investments, courts look past form and instead focus on the substance of 
the transaction: utility token sales are the sales of valuable property, as 
described in Section III.B.1. 
B. Policy Arguments against Sweeping Securities Regulations of Utility 
Tokens 
Courts should not strain themselves to bring utility tokens within the 
purview of the Securities Act.  The treatment of utility token sales as 
securities runs counter to public policy and is largely unnecessary to 
achieve the legislative goals of consumer protection and capital formation. 
1. Exclusion of the U.S. Market from ICOs 
Regulation of ICOs is a uniquely global problem because offerings are 
made by teams whose members are distributed around the globe.243  The 
government taking a hardline stance on crypto-assets and ICOs will lead 
to the exclusion of its constituents from the fledgling industry and 
expatriation of entrepreneurs to friendlier jurisdictions.244 
a. Exclusion of U.S. Investors 
One of the most exciting aspects of token sales is that they provide the 
opportunity for more citizens to get involved in entrepreneurial finance, 
an area long dominated by venture capitalists and institutional investors.245  
                                                          
 242.   Id. at 296.  
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Not only does this democratize which projects accumulate capital, but 
utility tokens sales also allow the non-wealthy to be co-creators in the 
ecosystem and participate in an exciting new model that could change the 
way the Internet is used and businesses are formed. 
However, if the United States stringently imposes securities 
regulations, issuers will just sell their tokens in foreign markets with lesser 
risk of legal liability.  Canada, for example, has taken a similar approach 
to the SEC, and unfortunately, has yielded this result.246  For example, Kik 
Interactive Inc., a large Canadian online messaging company, did not open 
its one hundred-million-dollar token sale to Canadian citizens because of 
regulatory uncertainty from the Canadian securities watchdogs.247 
In selling to U.S. residents, ICO issuers may circumvent some federal 
securities laws by registering for a Regulation D private-placement-for-
accredited-investors exemption.  By imposing securities regulations, but 
opening the door for wealthy accredited investors, the government further 
drives a stake between economic classes and deprives a social stratum 
from the ability to participate in the new economy. 
b. Exclusion of U.S. Issuers 
Blockchain entrepreneurs are not a captive audience.  They form 
flexible, international teams who can move at the drop of a hat because 
their work is software based and not tied to physical capital investments.248  
In the new economy, business is mobile.  Coders can just as easily 
facilitate work online from across the globe.  China, for example, has taken 
an extreme route in banning cryptocurrency and ICOs outright and has 
seen its tech innovators flee to places like Japan, which has the world’s 
most robust crypto-market.249 
2. Self-Regulation May be More Effective at Protecting the Public 
If the purpose of the SEC is to protect investors, maintain efficient 
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markets, and facilitate capital formation, its interest may be better served 
if it chose not to seek full securities law application to utility tokens, but 
instead embraced a novel regulatory scheme that bolsters innovation rather 
than hamstringing it.250 
a. Securities Registration of Utility Tokens is Unnecessary and Insufficient 
Imposing registration and compliance requirements on utility token 
issuances may hamper genuine innovators without effectively screening 
the opportunists.  The intent of securities regulations generally may be to 
separate wheat from chaff in instrument sales, but here it may instead 
separate the well-lawyered from the bootstrapped, as hiring securities 
lawyers is costly and developers are (at least in part) using ICOs because 
traditional venture capital funding is hard to come by. 
Securities regulations may also, in a sense, be under-inclusive.  It is 
not apparent that the creation of a prospectus would help the average 
person better understand the token sale than would the white paper.  One 
must concede, however, that SEC compliance could add legitimacy to an 
ICO and the protections it provides may be a value-add for token buyers.251  
Some ICO issuers have stressed their voluntary legal compliance efforts 
as a differentiator in their marketing materials.252  Proponents may further 
argue that registration benefits issuers and purchasers because of the 
existing well-developed case law that clearly sets forth rights, obligations, 
and protections of the transacting parties.253  Perhaps regulators are right 
and the registration process will weed out only disingenuous or fraudulent 
issuers, but this is a risky proposition in a fluid, global industry founded 
on a libertarian and anarcho-communitarian ethos. 
As for investor protection, with all the warnings, news of hacks, 
dooms-day dot-com Bitcoin-bubble prognostication in the media, it is hard 
to say that buyers do not understand the risk in the market.  The real 
outcomes of the regulations seem to bubble-wrap people without 
considering the context surrounding the novel instrument.  If regulation 
funnels investment opportunities only to accredited or overseas investors, 
then average citizens cannot harm themselves, so it seems. 
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b. The Private Sector is Making Strides to Protect the Public 
As ICOs have proliferated, so have private efforts at self-regulation.  
ICO watchdogs, trustworthiness rating agencies, countless consultants, 
financial intermediaries,254 databases and more have sprung up to hold 
ICO issuers accountable, fact-check, and provide information to 
consumers.255 
Consumer protection devices can also be built directly into the code 
of the application.  For example, programmers can set protocols so that 
funds raised through ICOs are essentially held in escrow until the 
development team reaches milestones or other smart contract-triggering 
activities, combating the perverse incentive of pump-and-dump 
fundraising.256  Additionally, there is industry mobilization for self-
governance.  The ICO Governance Foundation, for example, is facilitating 
voluntary ICO disclosure documents—the private equivalent to the SEC’s 
EDGAR database.257 
The more trust that those in the industry can cultivate in the public, the 
more freely capital will flow to ICOs and the more valuable their projects 
will be, so repeat-players are incentivized to behave fairly.258  The 
entrepreneurial spirit is engrained in the American conscience, and we 
should allow this experiment in private regulation to take place to 
encourage such innovation. 
c. Regulation of Blockchain Applications is Counterintuitive 
Regulation may be mutually exclusive to a truly functional, 
autonomous blockchain application created by pseudonymous issuers and 
governed by smart contracts.  Section 5 of the Securities Act, for instance, 
requires inclusion of the identity and background of management in the 
statutory prospectus.259  Pseudonymous actors and believers in self-
sovereign identity, such as Bitcoin creator “Satoshi Nakamoto” may be 
reluctant to comply with such a requirement.  Not only is regulation of an 
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immutable, virtual, global, and autonomous system a logistical nightmare, 
nationalized regulation runs anathema to the ethic of the technology and 
may serve to hamper startups and tech adventurers from exploring 
aspirational technology. 
C. Suggested Regulatory Treatment for Utility Tokens 
Impropriety in the ICO space primarily comes in the form of fraud, 
mania-manipulation, and hacking—all of which have consumer protection 
remedies outside of punishments for failure to register as a security 
offering.  For example, when an ICO issuer fraudulently claims to have 
diamond reserves or a fully developed product or guarantees returns, and 
they in fact do not, buyers can still recover (under theories of tort, contract, 
and criminal law) if we look at them as purchasers of an asset rather than 
investors or speculators.  When a hack occurs and token-holders lose their 
tokens, it is not the fault of the ICO promoter, but the criminal cyber-thief 
(although remedying this theft is difficult as well).  Robust and innovative 
consumer protections for token holders should be explored before turning 
to an ill-equipped, controversial, and risky application of securities laws 
rooted in the precautionary principle.260 
1. Govern as the Sale of Fungible Assets or Commodities 
Depending on the level of risk involved, true utility tokens operate 
more like gift cards (or poker chips) than stocks or loans.  Even if utility 
tokens potentially appreciate, their essence is to grant access to the 
platform’s features and should be viewed as the crowd-sale of an asset.261 
The speculative nature of crypto-assets is giving rise to markets for 
options and futures (at least in Bitcoin, for now).  That is, many financiers 
are treating crypto-assets as commodities.  Commodities are vital goods 
that can be anything people speculate on (except onions by legislative 
decree),262 but are usually thought of as fungible assets that are farmed, 
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mined, or extracted such as wheat, alloys, or oil. swings.263 Commodities 
typically have a globally uniform price (ignoring currency inflation and 
transaction costs like shipping and taxes) that trade in high quantities in 
liquid markets, giving rise to price-hedging and speculation activities like 
option and futures contracts.264 
Utility tokens, which act as the vital native cryptocurrency to their 
DAPPs ecosystem, are fungible and have a uniform global price.  
Additionally, tokens, when not sold in an ICO, are often “mined” assets 
that can be sold for fiat currency in highly liquid exchanges, and could be 
the subject of futures and options contracts.  In sum, tokens seem to be a 
quintessential commodity.  The purchase of commodities for personal 
consumption or commercial use is not a transaction in securities.265 
Even if courts do not buy the argument that tokens are commodities, 
they should be viewed as assets that provide access to a good or service, 
like gift cards.  It is not dispositive that token values are volatile.  If 
someone buys a gift card to a new restaurant downtown, the conventional 
wisdom that ninety-plus percent of restaurants fail and the card may 
therefore lose its utility does not make the sale a security.266  We could 
draw a more cynical analogy and view buying tokens as a gamble: yet 
blackjack chips are little more than risk-laden gift cards to the table at a 
casino and therefore have personal consumptive value (like risky utility 
tokens). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The use of Initial Coin Offerings to sell crypto-assets for decentralized 
blockchain applications is a technological, financial, and legal Wild West.  
Amid an explosion of popularity for ICOs, novel regulatory challenges 
abound.  Among them is whether and when ICOs constitute the sale of 
securities, namely investment contracts.  This Comment endeavored to 
provide high-level background and analysis on that question which much 
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public debate is centered. 
Although the SEC clearly intends to classify the majority of ICOs as 
the sale of securities under the Securities Act of 1933 and therefore require 
registration before sale, courts will in the near future have to decide 
whether they agree in principle, and in each specific instance in which 
litigation arises.  In doing so, courts should exercise careful restraint and 
hold that ICOs of certain DAPP assets—utility tokens, specifically—can 
and sometimes should be viewed as the sale of a commodity or asset rather 
than an investment contract.  In applying the seminal investment contract 
test, the Howey test, courts should recognize the economic realities 
surrounding this bleeding edge technology and far-reaching policy 
implications of such determinations. 
 
